Arnold Mindell’s Quantum Mind. The Edge Between Physics and
Psychology (2000) is a wonderfully creative exploration of parallels
between twentieth-century physics and Mindell’s own broadly Jungian understanding
of psychology. The book explains both the physics and the psychology in
considerable detail, making them accessible for intelligent beginners. The psychological exercises that Mindell scatters through the book are particularly stimulating and mind-expanding. Mindell
was trained at MIT in physics and at Zurich in Jungian psychology, and he has
been a leading teacher and writer for decades in the latter field, so he has very
strong credentials. He writes clearly and often evocatively. I don’t know of
another book that explores this territory in so much detail and with comparable
verve.
At the same time, one has
to acknowledge that much of what Mindell writes is inevitably very speculative.
His starting point, Jungian psychology, is itself viewed with considerable
suspicion by most academic psychologists. They place more emphasis than the
Jungians do on quantitative and controlled experiments and much less emphasis
on the study of subjective experience, such as dreams and synchronicities. Much
of academic psychology aspires to use methods that are comparable to those that
are used in physics and the other “hard” sciences. The Jungians, by contrast,
are more interested in the content of experience, which as such doesn’t lend
itself to controlled experiment.
So Mindell’s
investigation places itself squarely in the middle of the great divide between
the “two cultures,” the sciences and the humanities, “objectivity” and
“subjectivity,” which have so much difficulty communicating with each other in
our time that they have come to seem almost like two separate worlds. Writers
who try to deal constructively with this divide must be very brave, since they’ll
inevitably meet withering critique from one side or the other or both.
Mindell is emboldened, in
his endeavor, by the remarkable developments in twentieth-century physics,
especially relativity theory and quantum mechanics. These appear to undermine the
long-standing Newtonian deterministic conception of nature, and even the
separation between “object” and “subject,” on which the Newtonian consensus was
built. Like quite a few other commentators, Mindell senses that these
developments may open up an opportunity for useful interaction and even perhaps
synthesis between the two cultures.
So he goes on a long
journey of exploration through first the mathematics of Newtonian science (in
which he sees a trace of subjectivity in the “imaginary numbers” on which
calculus depends); then quantum entanglement; then relativity and its unique
constant, the speed of light; then black holes and virtual particles. In each
case he comes up with apparent parallels in his Jungian or “process work”
psychology.
Mindell acknowledges
candidly that many physicists won’t feel compelled to acknowledge these
parallels as significant. Physicists in training are regularly told not to
worry what is the real meaning of (say) quantum indeterminacy or entanglement,
but just learn the mathematical tools that have proven to be so powerful in
practical applications. Figures like Wolfgang Pauli (who coauthored a book with
Jung) and David Bohm are exceptions, and viewed with skepticism by their
colleagues. Mindell hopes that physics in the future will broaden its horizons.
Nearly a century after
the great breakthroughs of relativity and quantum mechanics were made, this
seems rather optimistic. I see no reason to think that the discipline of
physics will become any broader, as long as all of the financial incentives
push it in the other direction. What one can reasonably hope is that the
broader culture will become less idolatrous toward physics and toward
quantitative/ experimental methods in general. And we might then see more
individual scientists like Pauli and Bohm speaking to the broad issues that
their discipline, as such, will probably continue to ignore.
The main thing that may help
to reduce our idolatry of physics is that spokespeople for the “humanities,”
including humanistic and transpersonal psychology, are becoming less academic
and more deeply experiential. We can see this in Mindell’s own “process work,”
which goes far beyond the conventional “therapeutic hour” and the residual
“intellectualism” of (even) much Jungian practice. Humanists who have this kind
of deeper grounding and flexibility will be more self-confident, and better
communicators and teachers.
An intellectual
development that may provide aid in this whole process is the re-emergence, in
recent decades, of humanistic and transpersonal philosophy and religious thought. After a long period in which
leading academic philosophers idolized the hard sciences, a significant part of
academic philosophy in recent decades has been rediscovering a broader
perspective that was articulated by many of its classical authors, such as
Plato, Kant, Hegel, and Whitehead.
Coming from this reborn,
broader kind of philosophy, as I do, what strikes me about Mindell’s work as
well as about Jung’s is that they draw heavily, without really knowing they’re
doing so, on the broadly Platonic tradition in philosophy, religion, and
literature. This broadly Platonic tradition is so deeply ensconced in many
aspects of our culture that we scarcely notice it. If it were properly studied
and thus “amplified” and brought explicitly to bear on our ongoing issues, the
effect could be greater than we imagine. In particular, it could facilitate
precisely the sort of intelligent interaction between the “two cultures,”
science and the humanities, which Mindell is trying to help bring about.
Here are a couple of
examples of how Mindell draws on our broadly Platonic cultural background. In
his pivotal chapter 30 on “The Self-Reflecting Universe,” which sums up his
journey through the physics theories that I mentioned, Mindell speaks of being
“liberated, free of CR [Consensus Reality] forms” (p. 479). In the final
chapter of the book, Mindell speaks of “self-reflection” which “manifests in
the sense of liberation from yourself while the outer system
remains the same” (p. 582).
By speaking of
“liberation” and being “free,” Mindell appeals to a deep need and ideal, which
he doesn’t spell out. He doesn’t tell us how “Consensus Reality” or “myself”
make me less free than I could be, or how it could be reasonable to imagine
becoming more free in these areas. But we know, in some fashion, what he’s
assuming here. We know that a reality that’s not just a widely-shared “consensus,” and an experience that’s not just
“me” (in my familiar forms), could well represent a valuable kind of freedom,
because they could bring me closer to a
deeper, truer “me.”
This coming closer to a
deeper, truer me, is precisely what Plato’s philosophy is all about. A famous
instance is his allegory of the man who has been shackled in a cave all his
life, seeing only shadows that are projected on the cave’s walls in front of
him. When the man is finally allowed to leave the cave and see the real world
and the sun, he has been liberated from the shadows, which we can take to be
his familiar ideas and familiar desires. He now has a chance to form ideas and
desires through his own thought, rather than just habit, so that they’ll be his
own, in a way that the shadows weren’t. In this way, he finds his true self, for the first time.
It’s a version of the
“hero’s journey,” from mythology. The “true self” is the golden treasure that
the hero steals from the dragon. And in our ostensibly “scientific” age, the
quest for our true selves is still everywhere. It’s what religions and
self-help programs offer to help us to do, and what novels, TV shows, and
movies show us sometimes, through challenging experiences, succeeding in doing.
Even black comedies like “The Simpsons” and “Waiting for Godot” get their punch
from their mordant despair over our chances of succeeding in the quest to
discover who we really are.
Our culture has always focused
on this quest, so we take it for granted. Mindell takes it for granted. But
it’s precisely what deterministic science, including some of the latest
neuroscience, appears to challenge. So we need to explore just how deeply we experience this “seeking our true selves,”
and whether we could ever really think of ourselves differently. Why, for
example, would we care about neuroscience itself, if we didn’t care about what
we should really believe about the world, and thus about getting beyond
whatever mental habits we happen to have been trained in, to a kind of
functioning that would relate to the truth? We want our beliefs to be freely
arrived at, not just an “automatic” response to shadows. And we think that the
“we” that wants beliefs of this kind is truer than the “we” that just wants to
believe what we’re familiar with.
This is Plato for you,
and this is our culture. It’s much deeper, I submit, and much less “optional,”
than some of the “gee-whiz” literature about neuroscience, etc., would have us
believe. Because it provides the motivation for the sciences themselves, as
well as for the humanities (philosophy, religion, and the arts). This is why it
provides, as far as I can see, the only promising basis for a new, deeper
interaction between the two cultures.
A second deeply Platonic
idea that Mindell relies on but doesn’t identify as such can be seen in his
distinction between two kinds of death. In the first, “you experience yourself
as endangered, threatened, annihilated.” In the second, “you do not experience
annihilation but fluidly step out of time and become your sentient self, the
perennial immortal, one with all things” (p. 514). Plato describes this second,
exceptional kind of death in his Symposium.
And the Symposium gives an extensive
account of what makes this second kind of death possible. Namely, that we
clarify what we care about in ourselves, which is (ultimately) our effort to be
who we truly are. And secondly that we learn how to appreciate other people as embodying
this same effort, so that the world becomes a “sea of beauty,” as Plato puts
it, rather than a bunch of competing and endangered islands.
This is the vision of all
of the western mystics, from Plato through Plotinus, Meister Eckhart, Hegel, William
Blake, Walt Whitman, Rilke. Of the eastern mystics too, of course, but we’ve
heard about them. What many of us haven’t heard so much about is our home-grown
Greek, German, British, and American mystics. Least of all have we heard that
the central tradition of western philosophy
and psychology, from Plato through William James, Alfred North Whitehead,
and Carl Gustav Jung, draws on and articulates experiences of this “sea of
beauty.” So that these experiences are “in our bones,” culturally, and they
come out of Arnie Mindell’s mouth without needing to be explained or defended.
But the more conscious we
can be of them, the more effective they’ll be. So let’s get to know our
tradition and celebrate it. Let’s share more of it with Arnie Mindell, and
(more importantly) with Stephen Hawking, Richard Dawkins, and their followers, when
they show interest, so that as many of us as possible can “fluidly step out of
time” and die happy.